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Efficiency = Equity And Other Musings 
On Economics And Sustainable Development 
 





Conventional wisdom says that equity concerns are beyond the scope of economic 
analysis and that achieving equity objectives will often come at a cost in terms of 
efficiency.    Examination  of  the  underlying  meaning  of  efficiency  and  how  it  is 
defined,  however,  reveals  that  this  tension  between  efficiency  and  equity  is  more 
apparent  than  real.    The  paper  also  explores  the  application  of  other  economic 
concepts to the field of sustainable development, including the use of discounting for 
present value, Gross Domestic Product as a measure of well-being, and rational utility 
maximisation vs. bounded rationality as models of human behaviour. 
 
Introduction 
This paper examines key concepts underpinning sustainable development in order to 
assist in the assessment of policy options and proposals, and thereby progress the 
implementation of sustainable development principles across central and local 
government.  The concepts explored here will inform further work on Ecologic‟s 
research programme on Institutions for Sustainable Development.  The research 
involves case studies on resolving the tensions between democracy and sustainability 
and on integrating the cost of natural resource use into the market economy.  
What is sustainable development? 
The most commonly used definition of sustainable development is from the 
Brundtland Commission in 1987:  
Sustainable development is development which meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. 
The New Zealand Government used this definition in its Sustainable Development 
Programme of Action released in January 2003. 
While the concept of sustainability has environmental roots, it has a strong ethical 
(i.e. social) underpinning based on moral obligations to future generations.  In the 
words of the Brundtland Commission, “Even the narrow notion of physical 
sustainability implies a concern for social equity between generations, a concern that 
must logically be extended to equity within each generation” (1987, p.43).  
Hence, Principle 1 from the Rio Declaration of 1992: 
Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development.  They are 
entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature. 
                                                 
1 The author is the leader of a research project on Institutions for Sustainable Development, funded by 
a grant from the Foundation for Research Science and Technology and a number of other business and 
government partners (see www.ecologic.org.nz).  The author gratefully acknowledges this funding 
support and the comments of James Baines, Guy Salmon, Andrew Fenemor and other members of the 
research team, but takes full responsibility for the conclusions and for any remaining errors or 
omissions. 3 
 
Before focussing on economic concepts, it is useful to reflect on a systems-based 
view of sustainable development.  
A systems view of sustainable development 
Sustainable development can be analysed, described and interpreted in the context of 
economic systems, ecological systems, and social and cultural systems.  A “systems 
view” acknowledges that each of these systems is no more nor less than a partial 
representation of the real world through a particular lens.  The representations 
(systems) co-exist and interact; indeed, they are overlapping sub-systems of the same 
“real system”.  The essence of “systems thinking” is an explicit consideration of 
these relationships and interactions.  This is not the same as reducing all dimensions 
to expressions in a single numeraire. 
The challenge in integrative research, therefore, is to reflect these relationships.  This 
necessarily will involve researchers and policy/institutional analysts working across 
traditional disciplinary and sectoral boundaries.  The shift from working in a single 
dimension (e.g. analysing the economic dimension by itself or the ecological 
dimension by itself) to working across multiple dimensions requires a fundamental 
change in how problem identification and institutional design are conceived.   
In one-dimensional analysis, problems and needs can be relatively precisely defined, 
and this leads to the idea of a solution (in this case, an institutional design) that can 
be evaluated according to a narrow, internally consistent set of disciplinary criteria.  
In multi-dimensional analysis, the problem situation is more complex.  There are 
multiple needs to be addressed, and this leads to the idea of feasible, desirable 
changes in institutional design, which then need to be evaluated simultaneously 
against a wider set of criteria.  In shifting from a one-dimensional focus to a multi-
dimensional focus in problem understanding and resulting institutional design, there 
is a fundamental change from the notion of “a problem to be solved” to the notion of 
“a problem situation to be improved”. 
Economics and sustainable development 
Sustainable development is concerned with allocating the earth‟s resources to meet 
the needs of present and future generations.  The allocation of resources, in terms of 
production and consumption flows, and with respect to both the present and the 
future, is a central focus of economics. 
Efficiency as optimality  
The discipline of economics has adopted economic efficiency as the benchmark 
against which allocations are considered to be “optimal”.  As economists know, but 
often fail to communicate to the public, economic efficiency properly defined is 
concerned not only with monetary values.  It means maximising the net flow of all 
benefits, or value, derived from a given set of resources over time.
2  This includes 
market and non-market values, tangible and intangible, quantifiable and non-
quantifiable.  In its simplest expression, efficiency means that resources are not 
wasted.  “Waste”, however, is defined not in physical terms but economically: 
                                                 
2 In some contexts, economic efficiency can also be expressed as achieving a specific outcome at least 
cost.  In the context of sustainable development, however, we generally want to maximise society‟s 
outcomes, i.e. improve the environment, wealth and social well-being as much as possible given the 
resources (including human resources and knowledge) that are available. 4 
 
resources have been “wasted” if they could have been used in some other way that 
generated greater net benefits to society. 
Even without efficient use of resources, it might still be possible to “meet the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs”.  As a recent essay stated, “Constant consumption at no more than a 
subsistence level could satisfy this requirement, yet it would surely not be accepted 
as a reasonable social goal or target for public policy” (Stavins et al, 2002).   Major 
redistribution of wealth could theoretically ensure that basic needs are met, but it is 
unlikely to happen.  Hence, some economic development will be required to raise the 
well-being of much of the world‟s population.   
Thus, the more efficient the economic development (and the more it focuses on well-
being rather than consumption of material goods), the less strain it will place on the 
earth‟s natural and physical resources as we strive to meet the needs of present and 
future generations.  In other words, efficiency is important. 
Efficiency as a decision criterion  
Jollands (2003) suggests that economic efficiency should be used as a decision 
criterion only within a framework that first requires biophysical and social goals to 
be met.  In this interpretation, economic efficiency is only relevant after certain 
“absolutes” have been met – the “environmental bottom line” interpretation that 
some have applied to the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA).  Similarly, 
Bromley (1988) argued that economics should only be concerned with the efficiency 
of achieving the objectives that society has determined that it desires, rather than 
questioning the efficiency of the objectives themselves.   
The essence of Bromley‟s approach was adopted in the RMA.  Under s.32, Ministers 
and councils must carry out an evaluation that “must examine: (a) the extent to which 
each objective is the most appropriate way to achieve the purpose of this Act; and (b) 
whether, having regard to their efficiency and effectiveness, the policies, rules, or 
other methods are the most appropriate for achieving the objectives.”  This 
evaluation must take into account “(a) the benefits and costs of policies, rules, or 
other methods; and (b) the risk of acting or not acting if there is uncertain or 
insufficient information about the subject matter of the policies, rules, or other 
methods.” 
Although objectives must be “appropriate to achieve the purpose of the Act”, only 
policies, rules and methods are scrutinised in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.  
There is a danger of tautology here: i.e. an assumption that whatever objectives the 
democratic-legal process produces are by definition “sustainable” (and by 
implication, “optimal”) because they reflect what people want.  But are the 
objectives determined through this process, including with consultation, in fact what 
“the community” wants?  In other words, how robust is the democratic-legal process, 
and how (if at all) are gains and losses by different groups and individuals summed 
or weighted to determine the collective interest?  Can democratic processes in this 
area be assisted by use of better analytical tools? 
Economists have tended to the view that it is appropriate to assess the economic 
efficiency of outcomes as well as the efficiency of the means.  For some, this reflects 
a preference for a single decision criterion, together with a degree of optimism that 5 
 
social and environmental factors can be reduced to a common metric with economic 
factors.  However, the definition of efficiency that is typically employed by 
economists and policy analysts raises other questions, as do some of the economic 
methods employed in policy analysis. 
Pareto efficiency and intra-generational equity 
According to the classical definition of efficiency (known as “Pareto efficiency” after 
an Italian economist), an allocation of resources is efficient if there is no possible 
alternative that would leave at least some persons better off and no one worse off.  Of 
course, most policy changes leave some people worse off even if most people are 
better off, so most economists use the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion, which 
effectively requires maximising net benefits.  Under this criterion, a change is more 
efficient if it represents a “potential Pareto improvement”, i.e. if the benefits are 
sufficiently large that the winners could compensate the losers and leave no one 
worse off (Stavins et al, 2002).  Under the Kaldor-Hicks definition, such a change is 
“efficient” whether or not the compensation actually occurs.  Decisions about 
compensation are left to the political process. 
Pursuing equity is often seen as competing with efficiency, because distribution of 
costs and benefits on equity criteria can conflict with distribution criteria, e.g. user 
pays, that provide incentives for efficient use.  In this sense, pursuing equity can 
compromise economic growth, i.e. equitable outcomes might be seen as 
“inefficient”.
3 
Hence, there is tension between the concept of efficiency and the broader concept of 
sustainable development, assuming that the latter requires some cognisance of social 
equity.  Achieving efficiency alone is not sufficient to achieve sustainable 
development.  If 1% of the world‟s population held 99% of the wealth, this could 
hardly be called “sustainable” even if it were “efficient” by the Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion. 
Thus, a more difficult question is “what equity criteria need to be met for an efficient 
outcome to be considered sustainable?”  Or indeed, can in some cases “inefficient” 
outcomes be considered sustainable? 
Efficiency = equity? 
The Pareto definition of efficiency arises because economic theory provides no 
objective basis for comparing the well-being of one person with that of another.  
Hence, we can only say unambiguously that one situation is better than another (i.e. 
more efficient because total well-being is greater) if at least one person is better off 
than before and no person is worse off.  In contrast, an outcome is more efficient in 
Kaldor-Hicks terms if it produces more wealth in total, regardless of who gets it.  
The Kaldor-Hicks criterion implicitly assumes that all people experience an 
equivalent change in well-being due to an increase or decrease of one dollar.  This 
allows a change in total wealth to be treated as equivalent to a change in total well-
being.  
                                                 
3 Such a conclusion would typically rest upon the Kaldor-Hicks criterion rather than Pareto efficiency, 
because under Pareto‟s definition an outcome that leaves some people worse off cannot be deemed to 
be more efficient than another alternative, even if it results in higher total economic output. 6 
 
But notions of equity are based at least in part on an understanding that an extra 
dollar has more value to a poor person than to a rich person, and hence that overall 
well-being can be increased by transferring wealth from rich to poor.  While neither 
the Pareto definition nor the Kaldor-Hicks definition would recognise such a transfer 
as an efficiency gain, most citizens in a democratic society would consider that some 
gain in overall social well-being is achieved by such transfers.  Thus, at a conceptual 
level, the conflict between efficiency and equity may be more apparent than real, 
given that efficiency is fundamentally about maximising total social well-being. 
Of course, this does not mean that efficiency equals equity – the title was simply to 
get the reader‟s attention!  In practice, the tension between efficiency and equity 
remains real for two related reasons.   
First, it is difficult to quantify, either analytically or empirically, how much wealth 
transfer is required to produce an outcome of “true” efficiency in this sense, 
especially since equality of income does not necessarily produce equality of 
opportunity or outcome (on this point see Sen, 1999, chapter 4).  Second, wealth 
transfers tend to cause social externalities that could lead to longer-term effects on 
society‟s overall well-being.  These include the creation of poverty traps and 
dependence and damage to social cohesion caused by favouring particular groups. 
Such considerations serve to emphasize the complexity of social systems that 
sustainability analysis must seek to grapple with.  Nonetheless, the point remains that 
an increase in equity can result in an increase in total social well-being, i.e. an 
increase in efficiency broadly defined, even if total output is reduced. 
GDP as a measure of progress 
A related tension between economics and sustainable development arises because 
governments tend to measure progress by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and related 
measures.  In addition to using the Kaldor-Hicks definition of efficiency, GDP 
accounting treats “bads” (e.g. government expenditure to combat pollution) as 
though they were “goods”, while many other “goods” (e.g. leisure) and “bads” (e.g. 
personal harm from crime) are not counted at all.  These limitations of GDP are 
recognised
4, and governments are now developing and reporting measures of social 
and ecological well-being to accompany the national income accounts.  Still, both 
politicians and the public tend to assume that an increase in GDP indicates an 
increase in overall well-being, when in fact it might not.  See Figure 1. 
                                                 




Figure 1. Life satisfaction vs GDP per capita in the UK 1973-1997 (Government 
Strategy Unit, 2002). 
Concepts of the good 
Hatfield-Dodds (1999, p158), examining the philosophical tradition from John Stuart 
Mill to Rawls and others, raises the further question of whether society should aim to 
maximise the wealth it passes to the next generation, or to maximise the 
opportunities for personal liberty: 
The touchstone of liberal social theory is that there are a plurality of equally 
legitimate conceptions of the good life, implying that society should be structured so 
that each individual is able to pursue their understanding of the good with the fewest 
possible impediments. … This notion of liberty is also strongly associated with ideas 
of rights and justice.  Kant (1785), for example, argues that society should be 
governed by principles which conform to the moral code revealed by metaphysics, 
rather than maximising social welfare or some other concept of the good. … Like 
Kant, Rawls … upholds the priority of justice over the calculus of social interest.  
This is a radical challenge to modern economics, which is based on a utilitarian 
definition of “the good” and implicitly rejects the notion that there are multiple 
equally legitimate conceptions of the good.  Most economists define a public policy 
problem as one of maximizing the wealth of society.  To many non-economists, this 
looks like narrow-mindedness at best and arrogance at worst.   
This apparent divide can be bridged with the simple but powerful notion that 
freedom is both the end and the means of development (Sen, 1999).  That is, the 
objective of development is to increase individual freedoms (i.e. liberty), including 
freedom from hunger and other deprivations, and the best way to achieve this 
objective is through increasing economic, political and social freedom.  Thus, 
economic growth and wealth creation are not ends in themselves.  Rather, they are 
means to achieve the objective of individual liberty. 
Society should not, Sen argues, try to reduce judgements to a single metric: 8 
 
It is not, for example, to the credit of classical utilitarianism that it values only 
pleasure, without taking any direct interest in freedom, rights, creativity or actual living 
conditions.  To insist on the mechanical comfort of having just one ‘good thing’ would 
be to deny our humanity as reasoning creatures” (Sen, 1999, p77). 
Hatfield-Dodds (1999) makes a similar point, but his concept of “person-in-
community” also stresses that individual liberty must be balanced against the 
common good: 
The notion of person-in-community implies that humans are inherently social, 
that the central characteristic of justice is radical equality of opportunity, and 
that the deepest sources of well-being relate to issues of purpose and integrity 
and social standing rather than to income or purchasing power. … This vision of 
the good life … can only be realised through the promotion of personal liberty … 
which carefully balances the claims of the individual against the common good 
… a theory of ‘liberty-in-solidarity’ (p 162).   
As economists, we need to acknowledge that equity and efficiency can be mutually 
consistent rather than competing, that GDP is a poor measure of social progress, and 
that society‟s objectives need to be judged against multiple criteria, and we also need 
to apply these ideas in our work.  This would begin to bridge the gap between 
conventional economics and broader views of sustainable development.   
Models of human behaviour  
If one accepts that progress towards sustainable development requires changes in 
current patterns of resource use by individuals and businesses, then it is important to 
understand what motivates changes in human behaviour.  Economics is built on a 
theory of utility that assumes people derive satisfaction (i.e. “utility”) from a range of 
goods, services and leisure, and that “more is better”.  Utility theory further assumes 
that people seek to maximise their utility and are rational in their decisions.  
For many situations this classical economic model of the rational utility-maximising 
individual is sufficiently accurate to be analytically valid, but for other problems a 
more robust theory of human behaviour is required.  Daly and Cobb (1989, pp 85ff), 
for instance, have criticised the classical model for ignoring the fact that a person‟s 
perception of well-being is affected by others‟ consumption as well as their own.   
Hatfield-Dodds (1999) notes that the material needs of most persons are met through 
social systems, and that emotional well-being is shaped by social forces, including 
perceptions of identity and self-esteem.  Hence his view that analysis must focus on 
the “person-in-community”.  Hatfield-Dodds also notes that Adam Smith saw self-
interest as only one of three forces driving human behaviour, the others being 
benevolence and justice: 
Smith held that these different motivational forces all derived from the same aspect 
of humanity’s social nature, the unique human ability of individuals to identify the 
feelings engendered in others by social interaction.  This capacity for sympathy, he 
argued, underpins all human action and institutions, through the desire for the 
approbation of others motivating individuals to behave in acceptable ways. …  Smith 
considered self-interest to be the most powerful of the three motives, at least in 
unrefined cultures and classes, and thus argued that it should form (and be affirmed 
as) the organising principle for meeting society’s material needs.  He believed, 9 
 
however, that the good life can only be achieved through the exercise of all three 
virtues, and associated progress with the refinement of taste and the cultivation of 
the nobler virtues. 
Whether a “desire for approbation of others” is simply another manifestation of self-
interest is a moot point.  Even so, human behaviour cannot be fully understood based 
on a model of rational maximisation of personal wealth.  For example, people often 
exhibit traits such as generosity and take views on issues of no consequence to 
themselves (Boudon, 2003). 
One response of economics has been the theory of “bounded rationality”, which 
describes individuals as “fallible learners”:   
Alternatively, one could assume that the individuals who calculate benefits and costs 
are fallible learners who vary in terms of the number of other persons whose 
perceived benefits and costs are important to them and in terms of their personal 
commitment to keeping promises and honoring forms of reciprocity extended to 
them.  Fallible learners can, and often do, make mistakes.  Settings differ, however, 
as to whether the institutional incentives involved encourage people to learn from 
these mistakes.  … 
 
Many of the situations of interest in understanding public choices about common-
pool resources…are uncertain, complex, and lack the selective pressure and 
information-generating capabilities of a competitive market. Therefore, [in place of 
simple rationality] one can substitute the assumption of bounded rationality—that 
persons are intendedly rational but only limitedly so….  With incomplete 
information and imperfect information-processing capabilities, all individuals may 
make mistakes in choosing strategies designed to realize a set of goals.  Over time, 
however, they can acquire a greater understanding of their situation and adopt 
strategies that result in higher returns.  Reciprocity may develop, rather than strictly 
narrow, short-term pursuit of self-interest (Ostrom & Ostrom, 2004, pp 118-119). 
 
Watson (2004) described a similar approach, called social learning theory.  This 
model of behaviour, which can incorporate aspects of rational choice, recognises not 
only legal and financial sanctions and rewards for behavioural change but also the 
attitudes of “significant other persons” with whom the individual is associated.   
If the parameters are properly defined, both “bounded rationality” and “social 
learning” offer models of human behaviour that are consistent with economic theory 
but go beyond a simple view of well-being based on the material wealth that 
contributes to GDP.  There is an extensive literature on human behaviour, ranging 
across several disciplines.  While a comprehensive review of this field is beyond the 
scope of this project, our research will explore some of the work that is most directly 
relevant.  For example, in commenting on the inadequacy of rational choice theory, 
Boudon (2003) identifies non-utilitarian elements of human motivation that resonate 
with the views of Sen (1999) outlined above.  These broader models of human 
motivation and behaviour are likely to be useful in designing institutions for 
sustainable development that will provide incentives for people to learn from the 
inevitable mistakes. 10 
 
Economics and Ecology 
Discount rates and inter-generational equity 
A further tension between efficiency and sustainability relates to inter-generational 
equity and the conversion of natural resources into “non-natural” forms of capital, 
e.g. physical infrastructure or monetary assets.   
A key concept used in economics, especially in benefit-cost analysis, is that of 
“present value” of a flow of costs and benefits over time.  Future benefits must be 
“discounted” by some rate of return (which is often termed the “discount rate”) to be 
compared in equal value terms. 
Although discounting and present value techniques are often criticised, these 
concepts and criteria aim to maximise benefits to society from a given set of 
resources.  Converting natural capital (e.g. petroleum) to other forms of economic 
assets directly contributes to wealth and well-being (though pollution and social 
disruption from these activities can also harm well-being).  If we were to reject an 
“efficient option” (as determined by present value) and instead select an option that 
was less efficient, the result would be to bequeath to future generations less wealth 
than we could have bequeathed them.   
We might leave more petroleum in the ground for future generations, but if we have 
estimated the future value of oil using best available information (e.g. the substitute 
energy sources likely to be available), and taken environmental and social 
externalities into account, the petroleum will be worth less to future generations than 
we could have bequeathed to them had we extracted it and used it to build a better 
society.  (Because conversion of natural capital often entails costs that are not 
considered by private owners who are converting capital, society rightly seeks to 
impose conditions and constraints on such conversion, and/or to implement policies 
that “internalise” these costs to the private sector.)  There is, of course, the additional 
question of whether natural resources are in fact used to build a better society, i.e. to 
add to other forms of capital from which future generations can draw, or are simply 
consumed by the present generation. 
Thus, there is no escaping the fact that the current generation has to make some 
judgments on behalf of future generations: how much the present generation should 
consume, and whether to bequeath future generations more natural and social capital 
or more wealth, recognising that greater wealth will include greater knowledge and 
technology, but also recognising that value and wealth go beyond tangible goods that 
can be quantified in monetary terms.  The challenge to economics is to use 
discounting in a way that enhances rather than compromises the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.  Where critical natural capital is at risk, it might 
not be appropriate to use discounting and present value techniques at all. 
Critical natural capital  
The conventional economic approach of discounting has failed to satisfy many 
observers in large part because it can be used to justify as “efficient” an option that 
entails a risk of damage to critical functions of natural systems, e.g. the earth‟s 
climate. 11 
 
An alternative view asserts that natural resources should only be used at a rate at 
which they can be recycled or replaced, so as to leave an equal entitlement for future 
generations.
5  Aspects of this approach have been popularised, e.g. via The Natural 
Step, and have proved to be an effective motivator of change.  However, the 
conceptual debate has moved on, because it is difficult to defend a complete 
prohibition on conversion of natural capital.  What are agricultural lands, cities and 
dams if not natural systems that have been converted to deliver a different mix of 
goods and services?  It seems untenable to suggest that such developments cannot be 
consistent with sustainable development.  Nonetheless, some still say that 
sustainability requires the total stock of natural capital to be maintained (see e.g. 
Mates, 2004), a position often described as “strong sustainability” or “very strong 
sustainability”. 
Peet (2003, p.12) described a “moderate” version of strong sustainability, where 
substitutability (i.e. conversion) of natural capital is not seen as proscribed but as 
“seriously limited by environmental characteristics such as irreversibility, 
indeterminacy and the existence of „critical‟ components of natural capital which are 
not only essential to human welfare, but are also essential to the wider realm of the 
processes of life on earth.”  Indeterminacy can be taken to include the limits to 
substitution that arise because of the complexity of ecological and human 
interactions and our inability to predict the consequences of depletion of a resource 
and its transformation into energy, other resources and waste.   
There is an emerging body of work on identifying “critical natural capital”, i.e. the 
elements of natural capital that need to be maintained at all costs to avoid serious risk 
to sustainable development (see e.g. Ekins et al, 2003, and Ekins n.d.).  According to 
this concept, there are certain critical resources that should not be converted even if 
doing so is estimated to generate a net benefit to society, in particular where there is 
a coincidence of uncertainty, irreversibility and the possibility of very high costs.  
Where these circumstances prevail, it would be inappropriate to take such risks on 
behalf of future generations.   
While this work has produced some principles for distinguishing between critical and 
non-critical resources, in practice judgement is still required as to how much of a 
critical resource is required.  As Ekins et al (2003, p. 175) acknowledge  “…in many 
cases, … what counts as an “unsustainable effect” rather than a sustainable economic 
cost is a matter of judgement which can only partially be resolved by science.” 
Environmental bottom lines? 
“When an ecosystem component or process is pushed beyond its natural range of 
variability, that component or process, as well as others that depend on it, may not be 
sustained naturally” (Park, 2000).  In this view, ecological sustainability is “the 
ability of an ecosystem to maintain itself undiminished over some time period”.  
It is often said, therefore, that one of the mandates implicit in the RMA is to define 
“environmental bottom lines” representing the thresholds beyond which ecosystem 
components or processes should not be pushed.  Given the complex interactions 
among ecosystem components, defining such “environmental bottom lines” is neither 
                                                 
5 An exception is allowed for energy, since the second law of thermodynamics (entropy) does not 
allow us to capture and recycle all energy. 12 
 
as simple nor singular as it sounds.  In managing rivers, for example, we prefer now 
to define “flow regimes” rather than “minimum flows”. 
However, others have questioned whether the RMA does in fact imply 
“environmental bottom lines”.  Memon (n.d.), for example, claiming support from 
New Zealand case law, has argued as follows: 
The application of s.5 involves an overall broad judgment of whether a plan, policy 
or a development proposal will promote the sustainable management of natural and 
physical resources.  Such a judgment should be based on comparison of conflicting 
bio-physical, socio-cultural and economic considerations and the scale or degree of 
them and their relative significance or proportion in the final outcome from intra-
generational and inter-generational perspectives. 
 
I.e. there is no prohibition on conversion of natural capital to a different state if the 
result improves overall well-being, taking both current and future generations into 
account.  Local authorities or central government might define standards that should 
not be breached but, in this view, there are not “bottom lines” that can be inferred 
from s.5 of the RMA.  
 
Ecological sustainability requires integration of human uses of resources with the 
needs of the ecological systems that created or provides those resources.  It 
recognises that people are a part of New Zealand‟s ecosystems, which include 
production and urban environments as much as the publicly owned conservation 
environment.  However, New Zealand‟s most perturbed natural ecosystems are those 
of the lowlands where the majority of our settlements are and where most intensive 
production activities occur – hence the loss of lowland forest and wetlands and 
degradation of lowland streams.  
From the perspective of critical natural capital, whether this loss of lowland 
ecosystems is “unsustainable” depends on the functions that these ecosystems 
provide and how much needs to be retained to protect long-term human welfare and 
the wider life support processes of the planet.  In the framework proposed by Ekins 
et al (2003), much would seem to depend on the “information functions” that include 
aesthetic and amenity values; cultural, historical and spiritual values; and scientific 
and educational values.  Because of the subjectivity of defining how much of these 
functions needs to be retained as critical natural capital, in practice this approach 
might not differ significantly from Memon‟s overall broad judgement.  If, on the 
other hand, these “information functions” were left out of the “bottom line”, there 
would be a more objective basis for determining how much of a given ecosystem 
needs to be protected, though it would still be far from easy to do so.   
Managed transitions and resilience theory 
An important concept in ecological sustainability is “irreversibility”, e.g. society 
should be especially careful before causing adverse effects that are likely to be 
irreversible.  This is often referred to as a precautionary approach or the 
“precautionary principle”.
6  Irreversibility can be defined in absolute terms – e.g. 
                                                 
6 One formulation comes from Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration 1992: “In order to protect the 
environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their 
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 13 
 
species extinctions – or over realistic time frames – e.g. when degradation will take 
decades or centuries to remedy and thereby deprive significant numbers of future 
users for a long time if not forever.  This is closely related to issues regarding 
conversion of natural capital, discussed above.   
However, ecological sustainability does not require maintaining ecosystems in their 
current form.  In selected areas, conservation efforts aim to achieve this, or 
alternatively, to protect ecosystems from anthropogenic influences so that they may 
continue to evolve „naturally‟.  More generally, however, meeting human needs will 
continue to involve modification of ecosystems.  The inevitability of change means 
that humankind must attempt to manage, shape and/or adapt to change: 
The hope of the future lies not in curbing the influence of human occupancy – it is 
already too late for that – but in creating a better understanding of the extent of that 
influence and a new ethic for its governance. – Aldo Leopold, 1933  
Resilience theory (Gunderson and Holling, 2002) is a developing theory of adaptive 
change.  It suggests that systems as diverse as ecosystems, economic systems and 
organisations move between a series of stable states.  Living systems in particular go 
through cycles of growth, rigidity, collapse and reorganisation.  Even the notion of 
managing for Maximum Sustainable Yield for particular stocks is seen as flawed 
because it assumes that one can achieve a stable equilibrium within what is actually a 
dynamic ecosystem.   
Change can be incremental, lurching, or transformational, and abrupt shifts from 
stable states are common (ibid.).  The challenge is to manage adaptively for 
ecological sustainability, and to expect ongoing change.  Adaptive management 
means learning  - as opposed to planning – our way to sustainable futures.  
Sustainability can be defined as the ability to create, test and maintain adaptive 
capability and development defined as the process of creating, testing and 
maintaining opportunity.  According to Gunderson and Holling, key approaches to 
adaptive management include managing for resilience in ecosystems, flexibility in 
institutions and incentives in economic systems. 
There is no one management approach that is right for all time – adaptive 
management requires creating the right links at the right time around the right issues.  
For ecological sustainability, resilience theory suggests that a new ethic for 
governance should include taking care to avoid causing major changes to ecological 
systems because of the potential for unpredictable consequences, as well as being 
prepared to adapt to such changes should they occur.   
Conclusions 
The more efficient a society‟s economic development, the less strain that society 
places on the earth‟s natural and physical resources as it strives to meet the needs of 
present and future generations.  Efficiency matters. 
But conventional usage of economic efficiency as a decision tool can lead to sub-
optimal outcomes, because analysts typically employ the Kaldor-Hicks criterion and 
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assume that an increase in aggregate output corresponds to an increase in overall 
well-being in society.  Among other things, this ignores the fact that an extra dollar 
has more value to a poor person than to a rich person, so distribution of benefits 
matters critically in determining overall well-being. 
Rather than defining “the good” as maximisation of material wealth, economists 
should consider Sen‟s (1999) concept of development as freedom, and seek to 
maximise freedoms and opportunities of individuals within communities.  When 
efficiency is defined as maximising well-being rather than wealth, improving equity 
is often complementary to efficiency rather than in competition with it. 
Seeing development as freedom also helps to resolve the tensions in policy analysis 
that arise from discounting to estimate net present value.  Discounting future costs is 
hard to justify when it is used to support a decision that entails a risk of irreversible 
damage to critical natural capital, e.g. the earth‟s climate.  While decisions based on 
comparison of discounted values might maximise expected wealth, this methodology 
should be used in a way that does not put at risk the freedom and opportunities, i.e. 
the well-being, of future generations. 
From the perspective of critical natural capital, whether a loss of an ecosystem is 
“unsustainable” depends on the functions that the ecosystem provides and how much 
needs to be retained to protect long-term human welfare and the wider life support 
processes of the planet.  Much depends on a subjective assessment of how critical the 
ecosystem is to human welfare in terms of aesthetic and amenity values; cultural, 
historical and spiritual values; and scientific and educational values, leaving wide 
scope for debate.  The search continues for objective criteria for ecological 
sustainability. 
Ecosystems, economic systems and organisations move between a series of stable 
states.  Change can be incremental, lurching, or transformational, and abrupt shifts 
from stable states can and do occur.  The challenge is to manage adaptively for 
ecological sustainability, and to expect ongoing change.   
There is no one management approach that is right for all time – adaptive 
management requires learning rather than planning.  For sustainability, resilience 
theory suggests that a new ethic for governance should include taking care to avoid 
causing major changes to ecological systems because of the potential for 
unpredictable consequences, as well as being prepared to adapt to such changes 
should they occur.   
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